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THE ROLES OF LITIGATION
STEPHEN B. BURBANK*

It has been my p leasure, over a number o f years, to assist the Institute
for Law and Economic Policy (ILEP) in planning and presenting
conferences on topics of interest to the bar, the bench, and the academy.
When Edward Labaton asked me to take the lead in organizing the
conference out of which this issue of the Law Quarterly emerged, it
seemed a good opportunity to recruit interesting p eople to pursue themes
that are or should be of concern to those who conduct, preside over, or
study litigation.
The 2002 ILEP conference, "Litigation in a Free Society," was divided
into five program segments, each of which is represented by at least one
Article here. Taken as a whole those program segments constitute one
view o f, or p erspective on, the critical issues that confront litigation in the
United States at the start of the millennium.
The first segment, "Litigation: Evidence or Emotion?," posed the
question of the extent to which policy debates concerning l itigation and
the various statutory and other rules that attempt to shape the roles it plays
should and can be disciplined or informed by facts. Unfortunately, a
misunderstanding concerning the ground rules for publication and the
relationship between lead papers, comments, and replies has deprived us
o f the interesting Article that was presented by Professors Kevin C lermont
and Theodore Eisenberg. Fortunately, most of the underlying empirical
work that the authors summarized and discussed is already in the public
domain, 1 and their Article is available in another j ournal. 2 On question
after question, from the proposition that restricting jury trials would reduce
delai to the notion that internationally foreign l itigants fare badly in U.S.
courts,4 Clermont and Eisenberg have provided facts that call in question

*
© 2002 Stephen B. Burbank. David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
I. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial:
Defendants' Advantage, 3 AM. L. ECON. REv. 125 (2001); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128 (2000); Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates
and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORJ'IELL L. REV. 581 (1998); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, I 09 H ARV. L. REv. 1 120 (1996) [hereinafter Xenophilia].
2. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. I
(2002).
3. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jwy or Judge: Which is Speedier?,
79 JUDICATURE 176 ( 1996).
4. See Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia, supra note I.
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widely held views.
In this, of course, Clermont and Eisenberg are hardly unique. Empirical
studies that debunk claims about various aspects of the U . S . litigation
landscape have been availabl e for decades, and the work of Marc Galanter
in particular has long given them prominence in the legal literature. 5 Yet,
Clermont' s and Eisenberg's work is noteworthy for at least two reasons .
First, they are law professors who came to empirical work without formal
training in another social science discipline and after establishing their
scholarly credentials in more traditional ways. Second, their work
demonstrates possibilities to cast light on empirical questions by using
existing databases. It thus o ffers reason to hope that more scholars whose
primary allegiance is to law wil l be drawn to empirical inquiry, reassured
that others have done it without expending years, or having to rely on
external grants, to gather the data.
If the time and money required to do empirical work have contributed
to the traditional reluctance of law professors to engage in it, so also haE
their lack of relevant professional training. Quantitative methods have
become vast.Iy more sophisticated since Underhill Moore studied p arking
in New H aven.6 Whether, however, disillusionment with that p art o f the
realists' proj ect contributed to law faculties circling the wagons, the circle
has long been broken. The resources for self-education in quantitative
methods, as well as for collaborative work with those already privy to their
secrets, exist in most good law schools today.
The reference to the "realists ' project" may bring to mind another
traditional barrier to the pursuit of empirical work by law professors: tc
wit, the lack of a p erceived pay-ofC particularly for those early in their
careers and hence concerned about promotion and tenure. Clermont and
Eisenberg show that such work can be of interest to prominent journals,
and they are by no means the only examples.
The perception of scholarly pay-offs, being p art of the academic utility
function,8 lies in the eye of the beholder. For that reason and because oJ

5.

See, e.g. , Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986)

Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think w,

Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983).
6. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 30-35 (1986); John H
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhil,
Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 195 (1980).
7. See KALMAN, supra 11ote 6, at 34-35.
8. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 81-144 (1995); Stephen B. Burbank & BaiT)
Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 11 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
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changes in the scholarship produced in law schools, one should p erhaps
mark a distinction between that which a scholar pursues because it is
likely to advance his or her career and that which beckons because it is
9
l ikely to contribute useful knowledge about the legal system . For a
scholar of the latter p ersuasion, skepticism about the impact o f empirical
work need not rest only on the fai lures of the realists . 10 Yet, at least in one
lawmaking arena where the rules of the game are made-federal
supervisory court rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act-there has
been a sea change in attitudes towards the use of empirical study to inform
the enterprise, with the result that the question is no longer whether but
11
when and how.
It seems neither disrespectful of other disciplines nor overly protective
of my own to suggest that securing the interest of more law professors in
empirical work is important if data are to replace anecdotes in policy
debates concerning, and as the predicates of, changes in the rules of the
litigation game. That interest need not extend to the conduct of empirical
research, whether with data created as p art of the proj ect or with those
already existing. Certainly, l aw professors have the opportunity in their
teaching to focus the attention o f future policymakers, including future
lawmakers, on the empirical perspective; the opportunity in their
scholarship both to place their own findings and to translate findings by
others (including those in other disciplines) in j ournals such individuals
may be l ikely to read; and the opportunity in both to show the way to the
responsible use of empirical data
Here, of course, the Article by Judge Edwards and Ms. Elliott,
criticizing one aspect of Clermont's and Eisenberg's empirical work,
sounds a cautionary note, 12 as did the comments at the conference o f
Professor Deborah Hensler, a distinguished social scientist and law
professor who, as head of RAND' s Institute for Civil Justice, has been

9. Those who rebel at such a distinction may share Professor Geyh's view that public choice
theory-here as applied to scholars rather than judges-is "tautological and explains nothing" if it
permits including the desire to benefit others among that which an actor seeks to maximize. Charles
Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role in
Congress, 7 1 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 165, 1216 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, "Between Cup and Lip": Social Science Influences on Law and
Policy, I 0 LAW & POL'y 167 (1988).
I I. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and
When?, 49 ALA. L. REv. 221, 242 (1997); Thomas E. Willging ct a!., An Empirical Analysis of Rule
23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 7 1 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74 (1996); Thomas E. Willging, Past
and Potential Uses of Empirical R esearch in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 112 1 (2002).
12. See Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (and Unsupported Claims of
Judicial Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (2002).
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involved in some o f the most ambitious empirical studies o f litigation ever
undertaken. 13
Judae Edwards is no stranger to debates about the use and limits of
social 0scienc e research in the study o f legal institutions. 14 An
accomp lished scholar himself� he is also a distinguished judge who is
properly concerned about the reputation of the judiciary. He understands
that the standards which may currently lend prominence to a work of l egal
scholarship and enhance an author's career are not necessarily the
1
standards called for when serious people have serious things to do. 5 He
understands, therefore, that both that which is intended as p layful or
provocative and that which is offered as the most probable inference to be
drawn from empirical data can do unwarranted harm. Thus, whether his
questions involve research methodology for conducting a study or the
inferences that are drawn from the results, 16 Judge E dwards reminds us
that scholars have an indefeasible obligation to attend to the potential
consequences of their work and a corresponding obligation to take greater
care the more serious those potential consequences are.
Readers o f Judge Edwards' and Ms. Elliott's Articl e can make an
independent evaluation of the force of their criticisms of the work of
Professors Clermont and Eisenberg only after reading the articles upon
which they are based. 17 It would be difficult to disagree with the notion
that the data resulting from empirical inquiry alone often don't provide an
adequate basis for nonnative judgment or policy p rescription. In making
such an independent evaluation, however, the reader should keep in mind
that the criticisms in question here concern merely one aspect of work that,
taken as a whole, ranges widely over numerous questions implicating
public policy concerning litigation. And taken as a whole that work does
demonstrate that (relatively) unvarnished facts at l east have the potential to
discipline rhetoric and hence, perhaps, to derail improvident lawmaking.

1 3.

See, e.g, JAMES S. fG\KAL!K ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? A..'\1 EVALUATION OF

J\.iDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ( 1 996).

1 4. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L.
(1998).
15. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legat
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34 ( 1992); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70
MINN. L. REV. 9 1 7 ( 1 986).
16. In her comments at the conference, Professor Hensler observed that there are "huge obstacle'
to drawing valid inferences about legal behavior," and that there is very little theory available to guide
empirical research. In the latter regard, she concluded that perhaps the best "we can hope for are little
theories."
1 7. l am infonned that Professors Clermont and Eisenberg have prepared a response fOI
publication in a forthcoming issue of the Lmv Quarterly.
REV. 1335
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The second segment of the 2002 ILEP conference program,
"Contingent Fee Litigation," sought a more focused examination of the
same questions posed in the first, one that drew on experience in other
countries as well as experience in this country. We were fortunate to
persuade Professor Herbert Kritzer, a political scientist at the University of
Wisconsin, to present the main Article. 18 Professor Hazel Genn of
University College London, who has done pioneering empirical research
on civil justice processes and access to justice in England, and Robert
Heim of the Dechert firm, a nationally acclaimed class action litigator and
important contributor to federal civil rulemaking, served as commentators.
Professor Kritzer's Article draws on his extensive work on the
contingency fee, work that, together with empirical studies o f other
aspects of litigation, has marked him as one o f the most influential (as well
as wide-ranging) social scientists in the country on l itigation-related
questions. In it he debunks "seven dogged myths" conceming the
contingency fee, from the notion that contingency fees are a uniquely
American phenomenon to the notion that most contingency fee lawyers
accept most of the cases presented to them by people seeking their
services. The latter myth, of course, is but a variation of another,
elsewhere put to rest by Professor Kritzer but one that, l ike the Phoenix, is
remarkably resilient. That is the myth that the contingency fee i s to blame
for much of the supposedly frivolous litigation with which our courts are
supposedly burdened. Of course, this myth is all the more surprising in the
age of Law and Economics, since one would assume that, as rational
actors, contingency fee lawyers pick and choose their cases, mindfu l that
the dollars spent on losers are their own. Professor Kritzer's work has
provided evidence that this assumption is correct and thus that those who
regard frivolous litigation as a serious problem should look elsewhere for a
. .
wh rppmg boy. 19
Two of Professor Kritzer' s most interesting findings, each contrary to
widespread beliefs, are that ( 1) most contingency fee lav.ryers are much
more likely to rely on referrals from other lawyers and current and former
clients than they are on print or direct mail advertising and (2) the interests
of contingency fee lawyers and their clients do not routinely diverge.
These findings are perhaps most interesting because they are related. The

18. Herbert Kritzer, The Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASil. U. L.Q.
739 (2002).
19. See Herbert Kritzer, Contingency Fee LaH:vers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81
JUDICATURE 22 (1997); see also Stephen C. Yeazel!, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L.
REV. 183,212-15 (2001).
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former finding makes it harder to single out the contingency fee as causal
of changes in the profession one often hears associated with (usually in
terms of decline) release from restraints on advertising and direct mail
0
solicitation? Of course, some of those harboring such views probably
regard contingency fee practice with disdain in any event, in much the
same way as has been customary in Britain, where it used to be called
"litigation on spec."21 The l atter finding makes it harder to believe that
contingency fee lawyers are peculiarly afflicted or disabled by conflicts o f
interest. Purveyors of that view have always had t o contend with
knowledge that hourly billing carries its own conflicts baggage. 22 Kritzer's
work adds the element of concern about reputation to the mix, an element
that his finding about the importance of referrals renders wholly
unsurpns m g.
Just as hand-wringing about the decline o f the l egal profession,
whether traced to the advent o f advertising or some other cause, may be no
more than a pious mask for disappointment at the loss o f income resulting
from increased competition (or for something worse),23 so may
demonstrations of disdain for the contingency fee. From that perspective
(nay, probably fro m any perspective), it seems remarkable that within
approximately a decade the British went from a position of virtual
prohibition of "litigation on spec" to virtually universal tolerance of its
somewhat more discreet cousin, the conditional fee. Indeed, as indicated in

20. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
( 1977). Compare Florida Bar v. Went-For-It, 5 15 U.S. 6 18 ( 1995) (approving ban on direct mail
solicitation of accident victims and their relatives for thirty days).
If civil justice in the United States is in ferment, it is no greater than the ferment besetting
the legal profession. Indeed, the two phenomena may be related. There is reason to question
whether there is any longer a "legal profession," if by that term one means a group of trained
individuals pursuing a set of common goals and united, even if loosely, by shared values. To
be sure, in comparative context American lawyers have long been relatively entrepreneurial.
With the advent of lawyer advertising, price competition, and other pressures towards what
the advertising world calls "product differentiation," entrepreneurship may be American
lawyers' most salient shared characteristic. And it is the hallmark of an entrepreneur to try to
obtain a competitive advantage.

Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative Context: The
United States ofAmerica, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 69 1 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
21. See id.
22. See Kritzer, supra note 18, at 773 n.91.
23.
The social revolution of the 1960s, the quest for diversity on the bench it initiated, and the
changes in the legal profession brought about both by that revolution and by the revolution of
competition all may have contributed to the dissolution of the ties that bound bench and bar,
which ties included shared professional values and a shared sense of abusive conduct.
Burbank, supra note 11, at 225 (footnote omitted).
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Professor Kritzer's paper, 24 and as emerged even more clearly in the oral
comments of Professor Genn, "tolerance" does not do justice to this volte
Jace. For, the initial acceptance and spread o f the conditional fee in
England resulted from increasing pressure on the legal aid budget and the
eventual recognition that it could no longer support civil litigation by the
m iddle class. We see in that relationship dramatic evidence, were it
needed, of the importance of the conditional/contingent fee to access to
court. Because the United States has never provided legal aid for civil
cases that is worthy of the name, and because private litigation here has
long served roles that in other countries are addressed through social
insurance, administrative law, and the l ike, disdain for the contingency fee
could always properly have been regarded as support for the status quo, or,
less charitably, for unequal access to court. 25
Finally, careful readers of Professor Kritzer' s Article will note respects
in which his findings vary depending on the type of contingency fee
practice . 2 6 It thus reminds us of the potential dangers of drawing a map of
l itigation on the basis of only one p art, usually the most prominent, of the
landscape. In that regard, most of the complaints I hear about the
contingency fee relate to a few litigations-asbestos and tobacco-that are
hardly typical of the run either of tort (including mass tort) litigation or of
contingency fee practice . 27 The misguided approach to procedural reform
that treats all l itigation as i f it were complex l itigation can at least be
explained, if not justified, by the quest for uniform and transsubstantive
regulation that has preoccupied modem American procedural policy. 28 No
such justification is available when those who seek to "reform" the
contingency fee, or any other aspect of l itigation finance, seek to define
problems by reference to the extraordinary instead of the ordinary. 29
The third program segment of the 2002 ILEP conference, "The
Holocaust and other Human Rights Litigation," considered the prospects
for the use of litigation to enforce fundamental human rights, a possible
way also to begin to understand the limits of l itigation in the emerging

24. See Kritzer, supra note 18, at 746-47.
25. See Burbank & Silbennan, supra note 20, at 69 1-95; Yeazell , supra note 19, at 191 n.3 1,
2 1 1.
26. See Kritzer , supra note 18, at 752-53, 756-57, 769-72.
27. SeeYeazell, supranote 19,at 207-11.
28. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity (book review), 85 MICH. L. REv. 1463,
1465 (1987) [hereinafe
t r Costs of Complexity]; Burbank, supra note 11, at 225-26; Stephe n B.
Burbank, Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGAL Eouc. 513, 515 (1996) [hereinafter Procedure and
Power].
29. See Yeazell, supra note 19, at 216-17.
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world order. A medical emergency prevented Professor Burt Neubome
from attending the conference, but his Article was ably summarized and
supplemented by Melvyn Weiss, an extraordinary lawyer by any measure.
Two sets of comments, the first by Professor H arold Koh, a prolific
scholar, human rights lawyer, and official advocate, and the second by
Samuel B aumgartner, put the issues raised in Professor Neubome's Article
in larger theoretical and comparative contexts. We present here Professor
Neubome's Article30 and Mr. B aumgartner's •::ommentary. 31
Professor Neubome i s a distinguished scholar of constitutional and
civil rights l aw who, over many years, has bridged the gap between the
academy and the profession by practicing what he preaches. His Article is
a very interesting chronicle of some of the holocaust-era litigation by a
major player in that l itigation. Without pretending to objectivity,32
Professor Neubome nonetheless poses a variety of hard questions about
the l itigation in which he was so centrally involved and for the success o f
which he undoubtedly deserves great credit. 33
Mr. B aumgartner is a Swiss academic and public servant who has a
rare appreciation o f both the civil law and common law systems and a rare
ability to conjoin deep knowledge of doctrine with theoretical and other
perspectives that help to ensure that it remains our servant rather than our
master. His commentary suggests that Professor Neubome' s account poses
even harder questions for the future of human rights enforcement,
including enforcement through litigation.
Passing the rather different views of certain foreign l egal systems taken
in these two contributions,34 perhaps the most troubling suggestion in Mr.
Baumgartner's commentary is that the "success" of Pro fessor Neubome
and his colleagues may have been purchased at considerable cost, not just
to the cause of human rights enforcement, but to American interests in
other realms entirely. In that regard, some of the foreign attitudes that he
reports as having been generated by the holocaust litigation sound familiar
at a time when the American President's efforts to win support for action

30. Burt Neubome, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects ofHolocaust-Era Litigation in American
Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795 (2002).
31. Samuel P. Baumgartner, Human Rights and Civil Litigation in United States Courts: the
Holocaust-Era Cases, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 835 (2002).
32. See Neubome, supra note 30, at 797-98.
33. See, e.g., id. at 827-35. For a collection and discussion of the many difficult legal questions
in this litigation that were never resolved, see Detlev Vagts & Peter Murray, Litigating the Nazi Labor
Claims: The Path Not Taken, 43 HARY. [NT'L L.J. 503 (2002). See also id. at 504 ("The published
material is largely narrative and over-enthusiastic while the massive scholarship of lawyers and experts
on both sides lies buried in court files.") (footnotes omitted).
34. Compare Neubome, supra note 30, at 831-32, wilh Baumgartner, supra note 31, at 847-49.
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in Iraq dominate the news media.
More generally, Mr. B aumgartner suggests that the litigation Professor
Neuborne chronicles might have come out differently if conducted in other
countries, not because their legal systems are "stacked in favor of
defendants," "hostile to the claims set forth in the Holocaust cases," or
35
"fortress[es] for the powerful," but because other countries have very
d ifferent views about the roles that civil l itigation (and judges) properly
can play in social ordering. 3 6 As is true generally o f comparative l aw, this
perspective may be most valuable for whatever light it casts on our own
arrangements.
I f, as the Supreme Court has instructed us, it i s a mistake to insist that
ordinary disputes involving Americans be resolved in our courts,
according to our law,37 we should at least consider whether the same is
true of extraordinary disputes. That is not only, and not primarily, because,
as we have seen, people may not distinguish between them. It is one thing
to insist that foreign corporations with appropriate affiliations to this
country be subject to suit here, or that they "agree to live by the legal rules
that allowed the social and economic system to flourish,"38 and quite
another that the disputes involving them should be resolved by a "legal
process" that, at the end of the day, has very little to do with law, whatever
democratic legal system one chooses for perspective on that question.
Views such as these are not l ikely to win friends, although I hope that
they can influence people even when the l itigation that prompts them
involved perhaps the most sympathetic victims of p erhaps the most
vicious evil ever perpetrated. They are similar to the view I have
elsewhere expressed of the critical importance of fidelity to l aw (including
recognized means of changing it) by American judges in domestic
disputes, even those most heart-wrenching. 39 There are l imits to the

35. Neubome, supra note 30, at 832.
36. See Baumgartner, supra note 31, at 851-52; see also id. at 840.
37. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639-40 n.21
(1985); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 I, 9 (1972). The Court has hardly been faithful to
that instruction, however. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural
Law for International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PRO B S. I 03 (Summer 1994).
38. Neubome, supra note 30, at 831.
39.
[F]idelity to the rule of law in a democracy requires that, in the end, the judiciary abide
irrationality and irresponsibility in the political branches, unless it is manifested in behavior
that the Constitution, fairly interpreted, reprehends. "Abide" does not mean accept without
question, or for that matter, without insistence that legislative foolishness be clear for all to
see.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and Ideology in the
Work ofJack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971, 2009 ( 1 997).
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malleability of "law," including constitutional law. We do o ur courts (anc
ourselves) no favor by committing to them social problems for whid
existing rules provide no solutions and inviting them to transgress those
limits. For people who believe that law, including international law, iE
nothing more than politics, the question may not be tht::' same, but the
answer should be, at least unless they can guarantee that the judges of the
future will share their politics. 40
The last two program segments of the 2002 ILEP conference explored,
from different perspectives, questions about the control of litigation and
the best means to reorient it, if reorientation is found to be in order. The
fourth segment, "Securities Class Actions," took up again a subj ect that
has been a staple of ILEP programs and to which participants in those
programs have made notable contributions, whil e the fifth and final
segment, "Rulemaking and Reform," investigated the l imits of the federal
court rulemaking enterprise in bringing about change.
The organizers had two goals in planning the segment on securities
class actions, both of which are admirably met in the Articles published
here. The first was to cast the light o f empirical investigation on questions
of importance to the policy decisions made by the Congress when it
passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act o f 1995 (PSLRA). 41
The second was to contribute to the then-robust debate concerning the use
of auctions to select class counsel in securities cases. Apart from the
authors of the main articles that I describe below, we were blessed with
superb commentators, from an innovative theorist in the field, Professor
Adam Pritchard, to an experienced, highly intelligent, and refreshingly
candid federal judge, Shira Scheindlin.
For one inclined to skepticism about the public payoffs of empirical
work, the P SLRA provides no reason for a change of mind. Yet, however
shaky the empirical foundation of that legislation, 42 it would be a mistake
to quit the house for that reason alone. Experience in the lawmaking
enterprise that was the focus of attention in the fifth segment, federal
supervisory court rulemaking, demonstrates that it is possible to shore up a
shaky empirical foundation, whether to confirm the integrity of the
original structure or to renovate it. 43

40. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Chancellor's Boot, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 31 (1988).
41. Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
42. See. e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action in American Securities Regulation, ZZP!nt
4, at 32I, 330 ( 1999); Burbank, supra note I I, at 246.
43. See Burbank, Procedure and Power, supra note 28, at 5 I 6 ( I 993 amendments to Rule II);
see also infra note 72.
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I have previously expressed the view that "theory is an irresponsible
basis for lawmaking about something as important as access to court."44
By that I meant theory untested by experience, preferably experience
reflected in reliable empirical data. According to that criterion, the P SLRA
was an irresponsible statute, s ince a number of its provisions could
predictably and consequentially affect access to court, and Congress
lacked reliable empirical data to support the changes in the arrangements
for securities class actions that those provisions effected. 45 From this
perspective, the fact that Congress seriously considered making other,
more radical changes provides no solace-indeed, it may be cause for
greater concern-because the members' attention was specifically drawn
to the question of access by the SEC ' s pleas not to disable the primary
vehicle of statutory enforcement. 46
One of the PSLRA's most prominent innovations, albeit not a change
that had the most obvious impl ications for the question of access, reposes
in its provisions regarding the selection of a lead plaintiff, its rebuttable
presumption in that regard in favor of the plaintiff with the largest
financial interest in the relief sought (usually institutional investors), and
its conferral on the lead plaintiff of the right, subj ect to court approval, to
choose counsel for the class. 47 It is generally accepted that thi s innovation
was adopted from ideas expressed in the legal literature. Those ideas
reflected in tum both the insights of law and economics concerning the
behavior of principals and agents and data that seemed to support the
notion that it might be possible to harness the power of large investors to

44.

Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule

II, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1947 (1989); see also id. at 1962 (discussing the "unfairness of pursuing

sanction theories in the absence of facts, particularly theories that are in tension if not direct conflict
with basic premises of our legal system and with the articulated premises of Rule I I").
45. See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 20, at 694, 703.
46.
(T]he 1995 legislation was one of the few elements of legislative legal reform successfully
enacted by a Republican Congress that had a far more ambitious agenda; it was enacted over
the President's veto, and its final form was considerably less hostile to private securities
litigation than the initial bills on which it was based. An important reason for this
amelioration, l take it, was the strong and consistent voice of the [SEC], which repeatedly
reminded Congress of the critical role that private litigation plays in the enforcement of the
securities laws and of the Commission's inability to perform equivalently under any
realistically conceivable funding scenario.
Burbank, supra note 42, at 330 (footnote omitted). Describing his ongoing research, Professor Cox
stated that of a sample of 265 securities class actions issuing in a settlement, only nine involved
situations that resulted in any SEC enforcement action. Telephone interview with Professor James D.
Cox, Duke Law School (Oct. 4, 2002).
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (2002).
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solve the problem of agency costs in securities class actions. 48
Professors James Cox, a major academic figure i n the corporate law
area, has been a mainstay of ILEP's efforts to increase knowledge about
securities litigation over many years. Here he and Professor Randall
Thomas have contributed an interesting Article that seeks to shed light on
some of the theoretical and empirical assumptions underlying the lead
p laintiff provisions of the PSLRA. 49 Thus, their review of cases decided
under that statute leads them to conclude that "the l ead plaintiff provision
has not eliminated the strong interest of class counsel in the initiation of
securities class actions, so that they remain lawyer-driven notwithstanding
the P SLRA."50 They also report and begin to ask questions raised by data
suggesting that institutional investors may not seek l ead counsel status in a
substantial number of cases and may even be dispreferred i n some. But the
burden of their paper is to explore with data rather than anecdotes the
reported phenomenon of institutional investors failing to submit claims in
securities class actions that have been settled and to do so, moreover,
within the framework of the duties owed by such i nstitutions to their
investors.
Professors Cox's and Thomas' s data, the imperfections of which they
candidly acknowledge, 5 1 lead them to the tentative conclusion that
institutional investors are not in many instances filing claims to money to
which they are entitled and which it may be their l egal duty to collect.
Rather, however, than advocating any one explanation for that
phenomenon, they are admirably content to note explanations that have
previously been suggested, as well as to add their own speculations in that
regard, all as part of an agenda for more research.
It is quite obvious that, in commenting on the Cox and Thomas Article,
Professor Adam Pritchard has his own agenda, which is to reorient the
goal of securities class actions from compensation to deterrence, if not to
replace them all together with alternative methods of policing securities
fraud. 52 Critical to the argument he constructs is the inference he draws
from the main paper that "the compensation provided by securities class
actions to defrauded investors has a negligible effect on investment

48. See Elliott J. Weiss & John Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 1 04 YALE L.J. 2053 ( 1 995).
49. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional
Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855 (2002).
50. !d. at 858-59.
5 1 . See. e.g. , id. at 872-73.
52. See Adam C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883 (2002).
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5
retums" 3 and the suppori he finds in it for the proposition that "[ o ]ne of
the principal arguments of defenders of securities fraud class actions-that
they provide important compensation to defrauded investors-is
impossible to square with the available evidence."54
Perhaps I am out of my depth-! am certainly out of my fi eld-but I
would have thought that, although the Cox and Thomas Article provides
reason to doubt whether institutional investors are satisfying, or are likely
to satisfy, Congress's expectations in passing the PSLRA, it is not the gift
that Professor Pritchard would like it to be. Put another way, I do not find
in the Cox and Thomas Article that which would be necessary to tum
Pritchard's theory into a responsible basis for lawmaking.
Just because Congress turned to large investors to help solve perceived
problems in securities class actions does not mean that such lawsuits are
made possible exclusively or primarily for their benefit. The latter
proposition certainly does not square with my recollection of the historical
background of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Perhaps it is true that "investors
seeking to protect themselves from fraud do so through diversification, not
lawsuits."55 Others o f less sophistication or with fewer resources may rely,
as we have encouraged them to rely, on the integrity of our securities
markets. 5 6 Particularly at a time when greater resort to those markets by
average Americans is touted as the solution to a variety of social problems,
it would seem passing strange to tell them that compensation for fraud is
not available.
The fourth segment of the 2002 ILEP conference also included a
discussion o f the use o f court-sponsored auctions to select class counsel.
The discussion was stimulated by Professor Lucian B ebchuk's Article that
is published here. 5 7 Professor B ebchuk is an imaginative and prolific
scholar who brings the teachings o f law and economics to bear on a wide
range of corporate law and related i ssues. Since his Article was presented,
there have been a number of important developments affecting the debate
about auctions, chiefly the issuance of the final report of an influential
Third Circuit Task Force. 58 The Article and those developments provide

!d. at 884.
!d. (citation omitted).
55. !d.
56. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
57. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Questionable Case for Auctioning Counsel Positions in Securities
Class Actions, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 889 (2002). Because Professor Bebchuk could not attend the ILEP
53.

54.

conference, Professor Theodore Eisenberg presented his paper.
58.
2002),

See THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL, FINAL REPORT (Jan.
available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounscl!final%20report%20of'/o20third%20
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reason to doubt that auctions should or will play an impo rtant role in the
class actions of the future or that they have virtually any role to play in
securities class actions under the P SLRA. Even if that is true, however, the
phenomenon remains of interest because it illustrates more general
features of today's litigation landscape in the federal courts.
In 1 996 I expressed the view that the most important developments in
civil justice over the preceding two decades had concerned power and
argued that we had seen two related shifts in power within the landscape
of federal civil procedure in that period. F irst, there was a shift in the locus
of lawmaking power, as Congress insisted that it had a proper role to p l ay
in devising the rules o f the game. Second, there was a shift i n the locus o f
power a t the trial ( o r pretrial) l evel, a s trial judges insisted on p laying a
more active role in the game; that is, in the conduct of civil cases. 59 The
experience with auctions can be seen as an illustration of the phenomena I
described in 1 996, as well as o f the value o f the general perspective .
Granting that federal courts have a special , although not unique,
responsibility to protect the interests of clients who are members of a
class, should one not draw a distinction between (1) court action designed
either to regulate the existing market for legal services when it proves
inadequate to serve the interests of the class as a whol e or to referee
existing competition between or among counsel and (2) an attempt by a
court to create a new market according to the court's sense o f the relevant
criteria and declare a winner of the competition that it has elicited? From
this perspective auctions are the cousins o f managerial j udging and of
sanctions, another step in the move to empower federal j udges at the
0
expense of lawyers and their clients. 6
Some of these steps in the power struggle between the federal courts
and lawyers over the conduct of l itigation landed the judiciary in hot water
in Congress, spurred on by l awyers whose oxen had been gored, which i s
why I regard the two shifts i n power a s related. 61 Moreover, in my 1 996
article I described the P SLRA as a fire alarm for those who still wish to
contend for a monopoly of power in the federal judiciary to fashion the

circuit%20task%20force.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2002). In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 20 l (3d
Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Mark v. Cal. Pub. Empie. Ret. Sys., 122 S. Ct. 1300 (2002), in which

the Third Circuit disapproved auctions for almost all cases subject to the PSLRA, was decided before
the Task Force's report. For a subsequent decision of the Ninth Circuit taking a similar approach to the
PSLRA, see In re David Cavanaugh et a!., 2002 WL 31051543; id. at n.19.
59. See Burbank, supra note 11, at 224-26.
60. See Burbank, Costs of Complexity, supra note 28, at 1478; see also Stephen B. Burbank,
Foreword: Causes and Limits of Pessimism , 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1851, 1856 (2000).
61. See Burbank, Procedure and Power, supra note 28, at 514-16.
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2
rules o f the game. 6 Some of the decisions in which federal j udges have
ordered auctions in PSLRA cases indicate (were that required ! ) that the
judiciary does not yield power without a fight. 63 If past is prologue,
acceptance of the Task Force's recommendations would diminish the risk
of congressional action on auctions, as would acceptance of the Third
Circuit's interpretation of the P SLRA in the Cendant case. 64
The fifth and last program segment of the 2002 ILEP conference
examined the extent to which l itigation reform can and should be effected
by new or amended court rules given that institution' s history and the
demands of contemporary American politics. We were fortunate to have
an immensely talented group of panelists to guide the discussion.
For two decades, Professor Richard Marcus has studied and written
about federal practice and procedure with a sense of timing as to what is
really important and a nuanced appreciation o f the interplay o f doctrine
and l itigation behavior that are unequalled among scholars of procedure.
Fortunately, the federal judiciary has come to recognize his talents, with
the result that he is now a central figure in the real world of rulemaking. 6 5
His Article is presented here. 66
The commentators were no less distinguished. Suffice it to say of Judge
Patrick Higginbotham that, as Chair of the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee in the early 1 990s, he sought to rescue the enterprise from the
twin evils of ignorance and arrogance, proving again that politics need not
be a dirty word (and that the federal judiciary desperately needs more
effective politicians). 67 Allen B lack is quite simply one of the best and
most thoughtful l awyers in the country, a highly successful l itigator and
important contributor to numerous law reform efforts. After Judge Shira
Scheindlin agreed to serve on the securities class actions p anel, we
realized that we had in her, a member of the Civil Rules Advisory

62. See id. at 5 1 6.
63. See, e.g. , In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp.2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
64. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., supra note 5 8 .
65. Professor Marcus has served since 1 996 "as Special Reporter to the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules and worked on its review of discovery and class action rules." Richard L. Marcus, Reform
Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 90 1 , 903 n.l 3 (2002).
66. Marcus, supra note 65.
67. See Stephen B. Burbank, Making Progress the Old-Fashioned Way, 1 49 U. PA. L. REv.
1 23 1 , 1 234-35 (200 I) (defining politics as "the art of seeking to i mprove the human condition through
intelligence, patience, persuasion, and compromise"). Charles Clark, the original and long-serving
Reporter for Civil Rules, was thus no politician. See Charles C. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, I938-58, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 435, 448 ( 1 958)
("reformers must follow their dream and leave compromise to others"), quoted in Marcus, supra note
6 5 , at 903. This does not appear to be a judgment dependent upon an idiosyncratic definition. See, e.g.,
KALMAN, supra note 6, at 1 1 5-20; Schlegel, supra note 6, at 3 1 2.
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Committee, a double threat, and we thus prevailed on her also to serve on
the panel for this segment, to which she made important contributions.
Professor Marcus ' s Article is typical of his work: informed and
j udicious--one might even say old-fashioned. 6 8 But it is also decidedly not
old-fashioned in seeking to understand the rulemakin g experience by
reference to larger contexts, including one drawn fro m interdisciplinary
scholarship. 69
Although it may have taken the organized federal j udiciary too long to
grasp the risks run in seeking to attempt broad-scale reform of litigation
through rulemaking, as Professor Marcus' s paper m akes clear, that
message has been received, as also has the message that reason and the
rulemakers' collective experience are no longer an acceptable basis for
change. 70 He is quite correct to question the circumstances in which, and
the form in which, systematically collected empirical data should be
required before rulemaking can properly proceed. B ut, again, those are the
when and how questions rather than whether, which seems to me evidence
of progress. 7 1 At the Conference Mr. Black contended that the rulemakers
had not been sufficiently careful in selecting the obj ects of their reform
efforts, taking their cue too often from the anecdotal complaints of small
segments of the bar. Together with Marcus ' s perception that there is a risk
of precommitment once a proposal for change is pub lished for comment, it
may suggest that more attention needs to be given to bringing data to bear
on the question whether a problem worthy of the rulemakers' attention
.
2
ex1sts. 7
Were I to hazard any criticism of Professor Marcus ' s Article, it would
be that he remains, for my taste, a bit too old-fashioned in the apparent
nostalgia he feels for the simpler days when the experts controlled the
process, Congress was essentially indifferent to it, and everyone had to
live with the results. Put another way, he seems resigned to accept that

6 8 . This is a compliment. See Burbank, supra nole 67.
69. See Marcus, supra note 65, at 908-34; see also ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARJAL LEGALISM
(200 1 ). This is also a compliment. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power, J. LEGAL
EDUC. (forthcoming 2003).
70. See Burbank, supra note 60.
7 1 . See supra text accompanying note I I .
72.
The Advisory Committee [responsible for proposing the 1 983 amendments to Rule I I ] knew
little about experience under the original Rule, knew little about the perceived problems that
stimulated the efforts leading to the two packages of Rules amendments in 1 980 and 1 983,
knew little about the jurisprudence of sanctions, and knew little about the costs and benefits
of sanctions as a case management device.
Burbank, supra note 44, at 1 927.
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"many features o f contemporary rulemaking resemble the aspects o f
American government that Professor Kagan describes."7 3
Two of the commentators might have been thought to make a similar
point, albeit for different reasons and from different perspectives. Thus,
Judge Higginbotham observed that the "giants" of whom Professor
Marcus speaks could not foresee the external forces that would interact
with their product, and more generally that the fate of the rules is
controlled by forces outside the rulemaking process . In sum, he contended,
reforming the rules of procedure is not the same thing as using rules to
reform l itigation. 74 Judge S cheindlin, in tum, reminded us that the
composition of the rulemaking bodies is determined from the top down,
that with those selections comes the power to determine the agenda, and
that interest groups know how an organized effort can also help to
determine the agenda. From either Judge H igginbotham' s or Judge
Scheindlin's perspective, the messy and decentralized system Professor
Kagan describes may appear i n a different light, and resignation may seem
an inappropriately tepid reaction.
But this is probably nothing more than a matter o f taste. Professor
Marcus's Article is a thoughtful and comprehensive analysis o f the state of
contemporary federal supervisory court rulemaking, o f interest to
practitioners, judges, and scholars. It is, in sum, just what the organizers o f
the 2002 ILEP conference had hoped it would be.
* * * *

With all the attention in the media and in our l egislatures, state and
federal, to the supposed costs of civil l itigation, it is important periodically
to remind ourselves of its potential benefits . 7 5 Moreover, as the Articles
presented here suggest, whether the question is costs or benefits, the
responsible course is to seek data in preference to anecdotes and to
recognize that data require sober interpretation (for which additional
research may be required). These Articles also suggest that an appreciation

73. Marcus, supra note 65, at 942.
74. See id. at 902 n. l 0; see also Burbank, supra note 60, at 1 85 6 (" [A ]ny attempt to reduce the
expense of litigation can be defeated by the entrepreneurial ingenuity of the bar until such time as
reformers directly alter the mechanisms by which the bar is compensated. In this co untry, of course,
that would require legislation.") (footnotes omitted). Judge Higginbotham also lamented the apparent
view of contemporary rulemakers that a trial is a failure, which yields efforts akin to "sweeping the
floor while the roof is on fire."

75. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (book review), 79 JUDICATURE
3 1 8 ( 1 996).
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of either the costs or benefits of litigation, as of the roles that it p lays and
should p lay, may be facilitated by, and in an increasingly interdependent
world sometimes requires, a comparative perspective.
Whether or not a desired change in litigation behavior finds support in
documented exp erience, these Articles tell us that there are l i mi ts to the
power of the judiciary to be the source of authority and, indeed, of the
power of formal rules, whatever their source, to actually bring it about. 76
Thank goodness, because the forces o f personal and insti tutional self
interest are so strong in this country that one who calls for attention to
facts i n at least some forms of lawmaking may indeed be b aying at the
moon, 77 while power is distributed so unequally that the messy,
decentralized system i n which we l ive may be our best protection against
improvident change.

76. Cf J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23
J. LEGAL STUDIES 721, 746 ( 1 994) ("Judicial independence is not primarily a matter of constitutional
text.").
77. "(M]embers of the political branches have different utility functions than do federal judges,
and the rules of the game they play, including their norms of accountability, do not put a high premium
on rationality." Burbank, supra note 39, at 2008 (footnote omitted).

